(Most recent: Rick's rebuttal
posted on 05-29-16)
A secular atheist, Britlandt Abney, has offered to defend the position "Secular Humanism Offers an Objective Basis of Morality" and I wish to oppose it. This secular view has been defended by Sam Harris, but neither his argument nor any argument I have seen appears to be logically supportable.
We agreed not to rush the debate, but to begin after a few days or up to a week. I've requested the open introduction and main argument to be sent to me by email by Britlandt, The following are debate term definitions he's offered:
I. Britlandt's opening request:
First, I think we
ought to agree upon definitions. If we cannot agree upon definitions,
there's really no point in having any discussion for the "objective
morality" that I'm talking about might be entirely different
than the "objective morality" you're talking about.
Now, the definitions I use are derived from both prominent philosophical literature as well as common use of these words.
Lets start with Morality, fairly simple
on appearance. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
which is widely acclaimed to be one of the most, if not the most,
credible source for philosophy, defines it as the following:
1.Descriptively to refer to certain
codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a
religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or
2. Normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/
Put more simply, it is a rational code of "oughts" and "ought nots" or things we ought to do and things we ought not do. This also matches the Merriam-Webster definition:
"the degree to which something is right and good : the moral goodness or badness of something"
For the purpose of this discussion "goodness" and "badness" in a moral context are identical to "oughts" and "ought nots," respectively.
Next we have objective. Now this is a more confusing word that often throws people. Many people think that "objective" means "irrelevant entirely to any subjective being." This is false, however. What it really means is "irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being." It cannot be a matter of opinion but there are undeniably objective facts that directly relate to subjective beings. For example, it is an objective fact that my mother is sitting in her house right now. It is also an objective fact that she gave birth to me. Those objective facts related to one and two subjective beings, respectively. For something to be objective, it need only not be ontologically based in opinion or preference. It very much can relate to a subject and still be objective.
"(of a person or their judgment) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts."
https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=objective+definition
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/objective
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/objective
Virtually every definition in use confirms what I have stated in the paragraph above.
Now, there is a decent chunk of the ground work. If Rick agrees to these uses of the two terms, we can continue.
Do you, Rick?
Rick agreed to the definitions offered by Britlandt. And Rick then offered for Britland to present an opening argument or statement. Rick stated that he would prepare his own opening statement before reading Britlandt's opening argument, and did so as follows:
2. Normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/
Put more simply, it is a rational code of "oughts" and "ought nots" or things we ought to do and things we ought not do. This also matches the Merriam-Webster definition:
"the degree to which something is right and good : the moral goodness or badness of something"
For the purpose of this discussion "goodness" and "badness" in a moral context are identical to "oughts" and "ought nots," respectively.
Next we have objective. Now this is a more confusing word that often throws people. Many people think that "objective" means "irrelevant entirely to any subjective being." This is false, however. What it really means is "irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being." It cannot be a matter of opinion but there are undeniably objective facts that directly relate to subjective beings. For example, it is an objective fact that my mother is sitting in her house right now. It is also an objective fact that she gave birth to me. Those objective facts related to one and two subjective beings, respectively. For something to be objective, it need only not be ontologically based in opinion or preference. It very much can relate to a subject and still be objective.
"(of a person or their judgment) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts."
https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=objective+definition
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/objective
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/objective
Virtually every definition in use confirms what I have stated in the paragraph above.
Now, there is a decent chunk of the ground work. If Rick agrees to these uses of the two terms, we can continue.
Do you, Rick?
Rick agreed to the definitions offered by Britlandt. And Rick then offered for Britland to present an opening argument or statement. Rick stated that he would prepare his own opening statement before reading Britlandt's opening argument, and did so as follows:
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II. Rick Warden's opening statement in opposition
This is a debate about the foundations of morality and has more to do with meta-ethics than applied ethics. I claim that without a transcendent reference point, there is no logical objective basis of morality. There is no compelling bridge from the material “is” to the moral “ought” of individuals or of society for secular humanists. The question of morality always leads to the question of the “greater good” and how this should be determined. Without a transcendent moral anchor, any human attempt to define and qualify the “greater good” of an individual or of humanity in general will rest ultimately upon a subjective value decision and the system will have obvious conflicts and logical flaws.
Sam Harris devoted an entire tome to the argument that “human flourishing” offers an objective basis of secular morality. However, it is obvious that evil people and evil societies can flourish, and that the flourishing of evil produces less morality, not more. Secondly, if human flourishing is the prime basis of morality then supposedly there would be a moral duty to brutally torture one individual terrorist with bomb information if some new information could be gleaned to save a thousand civilians. The secular UN and Geneva Convention, however, oppose all torture on moral grounds. So, this is compelling us to consider that there is actually a different basis of objective morality, if one does exist.
A second popular argument is that “causing pain” to others is the primary objective basis of morality. However, on many levels, sharing pain in life is often associated with the sharing of important truth. The nerves in the body communicate pain to the brain when the body is being harmed, so that action can be taken. Likewise, family members confront an addicted alcoholic in a painful and uncomfortable process with the hope of overcoming denial and recovering. A result of this false “immoral pain” premise is the accusation that, “If I feel pain, then another person must have acted immorally against me.” This is apparently the basis of the criminalization of “hate speech” in opposition to the compelling right of free speech. And consider that if aliens on another planet did not sense any pain, would that mean that there was no morality in their society?
A third argument offers that “being healthy” and Maslows hierarchy of needs together offer an objective basis of morality. However, the life of the atheist Christopher Hitchens offers a challenge to this view. Based on his own words, Hitchens chose to smoke cigarettes because he felt it made him more creative, fruitful and productive as a philosophical thinker, and then he died of cancer as a result. What basis has any secular humanist to claim that Hitchen's life was less moral for smoking, despite the fact that he claimed that he received deeper fulfillment and productivity in life from smoking?
Peter Singer is a "distinguished professor" that has struggled with, and apparently vacillated on, the concept of objective morality. Having offered consequentialism as a basis of his ethics and morals, a majority of people have consider his positions to be morally repugnant, regarding support of bestiality and infanticide. So this compels us to consider that objective morality does exist, but simply cannot be accounted for by secular humanists. This is my view. I would offer that science cannot answer moral questions because morality is of a transcendent nature. The idea that science does not have all the answers (such as moral ones) is shared by most philosophers. “Today, among most philosophers, positivism is dead...” Referenced in The New World Encyclopedia under, “Positivism” http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Positivism . For all of these reasons, I do not expect Britlandt to have a viable argument in support of the premise.
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III. Britlandt's opening statement in support:
In a manner of speaking, I would like
to open, yes.
First, I'd like to state that Rick has agreed to the following definitions for morality and objective, respectively:
Morality: Normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons. A system of goods and bads or oughts and ought nots, with respect the the interaction of conscious beings.
Objective: Irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being; grounded in something that is not opinion based.
Now that we have agreed upon these definitions, we have to see what qualifies. It does us no good for me to make an argument for my side only to have Rick say that a specific angle doesn't qualify for reasons X, Y, and Z. This however, can easily be circumvented as an issue and simply.
To do this, we need only ask Rick what his system of objective morality is and why it qualifies as objective morality.
Rick: What is your system of objective morality? What is its ontological basis and how do you derive oughts from it? Once we see how your system qualifies, I will be able to demonstrate how my argument meets the same standards.
First, I'd like to state that Rick has agreed to the following definitions for morality and objective, respectively:
Morality: Normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons. A system of goods and bads or oughts and ought nots, with respect the the interaction of conscious beings.
Objective: Irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being; grounded in something that is not opinion based.
Now that we have agreed upon these definitions, we have to see what qualifies. It does us no good for me to make an argument for my side only to have Rick say that a specific angle doesn't qualify for reasons X, Y, and Z. This however, can easily be circumvented as an issue and simply.
To do this, we need only ask Rick what his system of objective morality is and why it qualifies as objective morality.
Rick: What is your system of objective morality? What is its ontological basis and how do you derive oughts from it? Once we see how your system qualifies, I will be able to demonstrate how my argument meets the same standards.
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IV. Rick's rebuttal to Bit's opening statement
1. Brit has so far declined to offer any affirmative argument in support of the debate title and the position he defends.
2. Rather than set forth a cohesive argument for secular humanist morality, Brit has shifted the entire burden of the debate onto my shoulders and requested to first evaluate my “system of objective morality” to understand, “why it qualifies as objective morality” - towards providing a standard of review, prior to providing his own argument in support of his position. In my opinion this seems to unnecessarily complicate the debate. As an additional topic we now have: “Does Christianity offer an objective basis of morality?” And rather than evaluating the logical cohesion of Brit's theory of morality using agreed-upon definitions, we will have two separate theories of morality to contend with, if Brit does later offer his argument of affirmation. In the interest of keeping the debate alive, however, I will comply with his request. However, I am not defending a, “system of objective morality” but an, “objective basis of morality” - per my explanation of morality, as the defined basis of this debate.
3. Brit requested that I describe how my basis of morality “qualifies” so that debate discrepancies might be “circumvented.” First, I will elaborate on how my Christian “objective basis of morality” qualifies with the agreed-upon definitions and, second, I will elaborate on the direct manner in which all “oughts” are derived ultimately from the one ontological foundation, as based on God's existence. To be clear, I am not arguing for the truth of God's existence, I am arguing that my position qualifies as logically valid. Hopefully, Brit will at some point either offer an argument in affirmation of his position or outline how his theory complies with the definitions and provides a logical bridge from “is” to “ought”- or both.
4. As the meta-ethical foundation of morality in the Christian worldview I defend, the Creator-God's good nature is unchanging, eternal and prime, and therefore exists as an objective basis, per our definition of “objective ...irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being.” God's nature embodies truth, justice, and holiness, in addition to goodness and mercy. God's commands are always good, being in complete harmony with God's eternal and essential good nature. Socrates asked Euthyphro a question: “Is something good because the gods will it or do the gods will it because it is good?” This is a false dichotomy, with regard to the theist God I defend. It should be answered with a third option: “If God wills it, it is good, because God's will is inseparable from God's good nature.” Because God's existence and consciousness are both eternal, there is ultimately no primacy of consciousness or primacy of existence. Both are metaphysically prime. God's existence and good nature are the objective foundation of the moral framework and “system” applied to it. Essentialist Divine Command theory, as outlined by William Lane Craig, would probably best describe my position on how morals are grounded in God, as explained at this link:
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/how-are-morals-objectively-grounded-in-god
5. The critic may counter: “God cannot be objectively good because of the allowed evil and suffering.” However, most philosophers accept Plantinga's free will defense and thus see the logical problem of evil as having been sufficiently rebutted.
6. The “oughts” of the Christian morality I defend are derived from both God's nature and God's commands, as based on essentialist divine command theory. As described by Dr. William Lane Craig, “...moral obligations and prohibitions arise as a result of God’s commands to us. God’s nature serves to establish values—goodness and badness—while God’s commands establish moral duties—what we ought or ought not to do.” We “ought” to follow God's commands because this is an “imperative from a competent authority.” In accordance with Divine Command theory, the ultimate imperative is not to define the semantics of what “right” and “wrong” mean and how they apply, rather, the focus is on their ontological foundation. Craig compares similarities to Ethical Naturalism, the meta-ethical theory that we are aware of objective moral properties that are reducible, in some described manner, to entirely non-ethical or natural properties, such as needs, wants or pleasure. Craig's “is-ought” references were sourced from the following linked site:
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/does-theistic-ethics-derive-an-ought-from-an-is
7. I ask Brit: Is the “basis of morality” I described in point 4 in any way inconsistent in his opinion with the definitions of “morality” and “objective” that had been originally accepted?
8. I ask, Is there any logical conflict in the bridge from “is” to “ought” offered in point 6 in his opinion?
9. Three more questions: A) Can secular humanism offer an objective “basis of morality” in a logically consistent framework employing the noted debate definitions? B) What is the “ontological basis” of such? And, C) How do you best derive logical moral “oughts” from secular humanism?
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V. Brit's rebuttal to Rick's first
rebuttal
//1. Brit has so far declined to offer
any affirmative argument in support of the debate title and the
position he defends. //
This is actually false. I worry for the
eventual outcome of this debate if my opponent is already
misrepresenting me. I stated, very clearly, three separate times that
i'm very willing to offer affirmative arguments. I merely think it is
simpler to see how he qualifies systems that meet the criteria for
objective morality first, such that we are on the same page playing
by the same rules. So clearly, my opponents first statement
bears no validity.
//2. Rather than set forth a cohesive argument for secular humanist morality//
The debate get worse, quickly. I've never stated i'm arguing for a humanist morality. My opponent presumes this and its actually not the case.
//, Brit has shifted the entire burden of the debate onto my shoulders//
Once again, entirely false. I do this such that the rules and qualifying criteria are clear, as i've now stated four times. Not to shift the burden. Its interesting that my opponent feels the need to misrepresent me so quickly. One has to wonder why. Now, if my opponent can give his basis and show why it derives oughts, we can proceed. Lets see if he evades further or if hes willing to proceed honestly.
// worldview I defend, the Creator-God's good nature is unchanging, eternal and prime, and therefore exists as an objective basis, per our definition of “objective ...irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being.”//
Notice, first, that while something with unchanging, eternal, and prime nature are not exclusive with objectivity, they are also by no means required for it. They're not meaningful criteria at all, as per the definition of objective (irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being.). Certainly, if my opponent wishes to demonstrate objectivity, he will need more than this.
// God's nature embodies truth, justice, and holiness, in addition to goodness and mercy.//
But are truth, justice, holiness, and mercy objectively good moral things? Of course, most of us agree that they are on a knowledge basis but how does my opponent defend that these things are good? He uses them as a defense for God being a basis of morality by...apparently presuming that the aspects of God's nature are good. But to use this as a defense he must demonstrate, separately, that these aspects are in fact of good moral nature. So far, I see no defense for this and thus, no defense that God can be a grounding of objective goodness, except by tautological defense (which of course, fails).
//5. The critic may counter: “God cannot be objectively good because of the allowed evil and suffering.” However, most philosophers accept Plantinga's free will defense and thus see the logical problem of evil as having been sufficiently rebutted.
//I'm not here to argue that God is evil. I'm here to ask my opponent why God is good. So I won't give any challenge here. //“...moral obligations and prohibitions arise as a result of God’s commands to us// Why are we obligated to follow the commands of a powerful being? I see no justification for this.
// God’s nature serves to establish values—goodness and badness//
Once again, this seems either undefended or insufficiently defended by tautology. Through what explanation does my opponent defend that God's nature/aspects are good, except by pure definition?
// We “ought” to follow God's commands because this is an “imperative from a competent authority.”//
Through what system does God derive rightful authority such that these ougthts are objective to us? My opponent offers no explanation here. Perhaps he might say "Because God created us and all that is." But that only gives us an ought if we think justice and gratitude are good. But are they? Can my opponent separately (outside of mere definition) defend that these are good? If he can't, then God derives no authority and thus no ought, on this explanation.
//7. I ask Brit: Is the “basis of morality” I described in point 4 in any way inconsistent in his opinion with the definitions of “morality” and “objective” that had been originally accepted? //
Not apparently, no, except by way of tautology.
//8. I ask, Is there any logical conflict in the bridge from “is” to “ought” offered in point 6 in his opinion? //
Once again, not apparently. The oughts seem to be question begging or bare assertions of authority. I see no actual derivation of oughts here.
//9. Three more questions: A) Can secular humanism offer an objective “basis of morality” in a logically consistent framework employing the noted debate definitions? B) What is the “ontological basis” of such? And, C) How do you best derive logical moral “oughts” from secular humanism?//
As stated i'm not arguing for secular humanism. But my system can give an ontological basis and it can derive oughts, yes. The problem here is, if I were going by my opponent's standards (as given thus far) my explanation would be simple. I could simply state that Justice, Mercy, Compassion, Joy, and Honesty were good by definition. That the very nature of these things were of goodness. Goodness, in a moral context is synonymous with "oughts" and badness synonymous with "ought nots." Therefore if we establish that something is indeed good, by definition, we have already derived an ought. If honesty is good, in a moral context, then we ought be honest, by definition of morality. No authority is needed, no alternative derivation of any kind required. My opponent's argument rests on Mercy, Justice, and other aspects being good and of God's nature, by mere definition. Thus my opponent establishes his basis by mere tautology of these allegedly good aspects. If I wanted to match my opponent's standards, I could merely define these aspects as "good" without attaching them to any conscious agency and without establishing any authority, and my "oughts" would already be derived. If they were good aspects by definition, then their ontological basis wouldn't be of opinions or subjectivity. Thus my system would already meet all three criteria (objective basis, oughts derived, logically consistent.
//2. Rather than set forth a cohesive argument for secular humanist morality//
The debate get worse, quickly. I've never stated i'm arguing for a humanist morality. My opponent presumes this and its actually not the case.
//, Brit has shifted the entire burden of the debate onto my shoulders//
Once again, entirely false. I do this such that the rules and qualifying criteria are clear, as i've now stated four times. Not to shift the burden. Its interesting that my opponent feels the need to misrepresent me so quickly. One has to wonder why. Now, if my opponent can give his basis and show why it derives oughts, we can proceed. Lets see if he evades further or if hes willing to proceed honestly.
// worldview I defend, the Creator-God's good nature is unchanging, eternal and prime, and therefore exists as an objective basis, per our definition of “objective ...irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being.”//
Notice, first, that while something with unchanging, eternal, and prime nature are not exclusive with objectivity, they are also by no means required for it. They're not meaningful criteria at all, as per the definition of objective (irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being.). Certainly, if my opponent wishes to demonstrate objectivity, he will need more than this.
// God's nature embodies truth, justice, and holiness, in addition to goodness and mercy.//
But are truth, justice, holiness, and mercy objectively good moral things? Of course, most of us agree that they are on a knowledge basis but how does my opponent defend that these things are good? He uses them as a defense for God being a basis of morality by...apparently presuming that the aspects of God's nature are good. But to use this as a defense he must demonstrate, separately, that these aspects are in fact of good moral nature. So far, I see no defense for this and thus, no defense that God can be a grounding of objective goodness, except by tautological defense (which of course, fails).
//5. The critic may counter: “God cannot be objectively good because of the allowed evil and suffering.” However, most philosophers accept Plantinga's free will defense and thus see the logical problem of evil as having been sufficiently rebutted.
//I'm not here to argue that God is evil. I'm here to ask my opponent why God is good. So I won't give any challenge here. //“...moral obligations and prohibitions arise as a result of God’s commands to us// Why are we obligated to follow the commands of a powerful being? I see no justification for this.
// God’s nature serves to establish values—goodness and badness//
Once again, this seems either undefended or insufficiently defended by tautology. Through what explanation does my opponent defend that God's nature/aspects are good, except by pure definition?
// We “ought” to follow God's commands because this is an “imperative from a competent authority.”//
Through what system does God derive rightful authority such that these ougthts are objective to us? My opponent offers no explanation here. Perhaps he might say "Because God created us and all that is." But that only gives us an ought if we think justice and gratitude are good. But are they? Can my opponent separately (outside of mere definition) defend that these are good? If he can't, then God derives no authority and thus no ought, on this explanation.
//7. I ask Brit: Is the “basis of morality” I described in point 4 in any way inconsistent in his opinion with the definitions of “morality” and “objective” that had been originally accepted? //
Not apparently, no, except by way of tautology.
//8. I ask, Is there any logical conflict in the bridge from “is” to “ought” offered in point 6 in his opinion? //
Once again, not apparently. The oughts seem to be question begging or bare assertions of authority. I see no actual derivation of oughts here.
//9. Three more questions: A) Can secular humanism offer an objective “basis of morality” in a logically consistent framework employing the noted debate definitions? B) What is the “ontological basis” of such? And, C) How do you best derive logical moral “oughts” from secular humanism?//
As stated i'm not arguing for secular humanism. But my system can give an ontological basis and it can derive oughts, yes. The problem here is, if I were going by my opponent's standards (as given thus far) my explanation would be simple. I could simply state that Justice, Mercy, Compassion, Joy, and Honesty were good by definition. That the very nature of these things were of goodness. Goodness, in a moral context is synonymous with "oughts" and badness synonymous with "ought nots." Therefore if we establish that something is indeed good, by definition, we have already derived an ought. If honesty is good, in a moral context, then we ought be honest, by definition of morality. No authority is needed, no alternative derivation of any kind required. My opponent's argument rests on Mercy, Justice, and other aspects being good and of God's nature, by mere definition. Thus my opponent establishes his basis by mere tautology of these allegedly good aspects. If I wanted to match my opponent's standards, I could merely define these aspects as "good" without attaching them to any conscious agency and without establishing any authority, and my "oughts" would already be derived. If they were good aspects by definition, then their ontological basis wouldn't be of opinions or subjectivity. Thus my system would already meet all three criteria (objective basis, oughts derived, logically consistent.
This is why I challenged my opponent to
give criteria. His criteria are met by God by definition
alone. By that criteria, virtually any secular system could qualify.
My system is much more refined than the above given example so
perhaps my opponent would like to restate his argument and give some
external defense that doesn't boil down to definition so we can have
some meaningful criteria for objective systems. I'll give my opponent
one chance to edit his criteria. Whether he does so sufficiently or
not, I will give my system on my next response: Guaranteed.
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VI. Rick's rebuttal to Brit's first
rebuttal
1. “ //1. Brit has so far declined to
offer any affirmative argument in support of the debate title and the
position he defends. //
B: “This is actually false. I worry
for the eventual outcome of this debate if my opponent is already
misrepresenting me...So clearly, my opponents first statement bears
no validity.”
R: Brit claims I've made a “false” statement and I'm “misrepresenting” him, apparently based on his narrow apprehension of the meaning of the word “offer.” Fact check: Websters' has three definitions of the verb “to offer” (and let's take a look at Cambridge also for good measure).
Simple Definition of “offer” (verb)
R: Brit claims I've made a “false” statement and I'm “misrepresenting” him, apparently based on his narrow apprehension of the meaning of the word “offer.” Fact check: Websters' has three definitions of the verb “to offer” (and let's take a look at Cambridge also for good measure).
Simple Definition of “offer” (verb)
- : to give someone the opportunity to accept or take (something)
- : to say that you are willing to do something
- : to make (something) available : to provide or supply (something)
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/offer
1. offer verb (AGREE TO GIVE)
[I/T] to ask someone if he or she would like to have something or would like you to do something:[T] She was offered a new job.[T] Can I offer you (= Would you like) something to drink?[I] My father offered to take us to the airport.
2. offer verb (PROVIDE)
1. offer verb (AGREE TO GIVE)
[I/T] to ask someone if he or she would like to have something or would like you to do something:[T] She was offered a new job.[T] Can I offer you (= Would you like) something to drink?[I] My father offered to take us to the airport.
2. offer verb (PROVIDE)
[T] to provide or supply something:The organization offers free legal advice to
low-income people. He offered excuses but
no real explanation.
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/offer
I believe that we were both applying different meanings of the same verb:“to offer” and I believe that we simply had a misunderstanding. But if you wish to continue to assert that I was misrepresenting you, then explain why definition 3 of Websters and definition 2 of Cambridge are not valid definitions, or why I should not be permitted to use them.
2. “//2. Rather than set forth a cohesive argument for secular humanist morality//
B: “The debate get worse, quickly. I've never stated i'm arguing for a humanist morality. My opponent presumes this and its actually not the case.”
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/offer
I believe that we were both applying different meanings of the same verb:“to offer” and I believe that we simply had a misunderstanding. But if you wish to continue to assert that I was misrepresenting you, then explain why definition 3 of Websters and definition 2 of Cambridge are not valid definitions, or why I should not be permitted to use them.
2. “//2. Rather than set forth a cohesive argument for secular humanist morality//
B: “The debate get worse, quickly. I've never stated i'm arguing for a humanist morality. My opponent presumes this and its actually not the case.”
R: Brit has clarified that he is not arguing for “humanist
morality” and I take no issue with that. I had made that noted
comment based on his official debate position and also because he had
not objected to the debate introduction: “A secular atheist,
Britlandt Abney, has offered to defend the position " Based on
your present objection, I don't want to presume that you are a
“secular atheist” and I can redefine your view as a person at the
intro of this debate. Whatever you prefer I am open to writing it
there.
//, Brit has shifted the entire burden of the debate onto my shoulders//
B: Once again, entirely false. I do this such that the rules and qualifying criteria are clear, as I’ve now stated four times. Not to shift the burden. Its interesting that my opponent feels the need to misrepresent me so quickly. One has to wonder why. Now, if my opponent can give his basis and show why it derives oughts, we can proceed. Lets see if he evades further or if hes willing to proceed honestly.
R: While I agreed that it would be helpful to decide upon definitions before a debate, I've been skeptical about the explanation of why I need to divert the debate topic and format. The following site demonstrates that there are many conventional debate formats, and they all apparently begin with affirmative and constructive arguments in support of the debate topic position leading off the debate.
http://www.csun.edu/~dgw61315/debformats.html
Based on standard debate conventions, the one arguing in affirmation of a debate topic has the burden of of opening with affirmative and constructive arguments. I did agree to deviate from convention in order to keep the debate alive, by first offering support in affirmation of the objective basis of morality with regard to Christianity. And I don't appreciate the insinuation that I am being decisive for simply pointing out this deviation. Can you find one example of any conventional debate format where the debater arguing in opposition to the debate topic premise is required to first support their argument or open the debate in affirmation of an opposing position? If so, show a link to an example.
3. “// worldview I defend, the Creator-God's good nature is unchanging, eternal and prime, and therefore exists as an objective basis, per our definition of “objective ...irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being.”//
B: Notice, first, that while something with unchanging, eternal, and prime nature are not exclusive with objectivity, they are also by no means required for it. They're not meaningful criteria at all, as per the definition of objective (irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being.). Certainly, if my opponent wishes to demonstrate objectivity, he will need more than this.
R: Specific definition qualities of the concept “objective” are exclusive with objectivity, as we've agreed upon here: ”..irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being.” And these definition qualities are also inclusive in terms of describing God's moral nature, as an eternal, unchanging state of moral perfection. There is nothing conceptually that could be, “more than this” - in my opinion, with regard to a meta-ethical objective basis of morality. Point 4 elaborates on the meaningful context of objective moral values.
4. “// God's nature embodies truth, justice, and holiness, in addition to goodness and mercy.//
B: But are truth, justice, holiness, and mercy objectively good moral things? Of course, most of us agree that they are on a knowledge basis but how does my opponent defend that these things are good? He uses them as a defense for God being a basis of morality by...apparently presuming that the aspects of God's nature are good. But to use this as a defense he must demonstrate, separately, that these aspects are in fact of good moral nature. So far, I see no defense for this and thus, no defense that God can be a grounding of objective goodness, except by tautological defense (which of course, fails).
R: Brit offers a very good question: “...how does my opponent defend that these things are good?” How can I defend that moral qualities attributed to God are “actually” good? The question is similar to: What is the standard outside of God that I use to claim to know what goodness is like in order to then claim that God is good? If I merely claim that God represents goodness and goodness is defined by God, then this is a tautology. I can address these questions with the following approaches.
I. Conceptual necessities and possibilities. - Based on the understanding that an objective basis of morality must be non-arbitrary and, “not influenced by personal feelings or opinions,” a non-arbitrary moral basis is only conceivably possible if, A) There is a supreme and capable moral authority and law giver that provides perfect moral decrees (see Essentialist Divine Command Theory, IV.4.), or, B) There is a valid and objective locus or standard of morality ( a perfect moral yardstick that applies to all moral agents and all moral questions). There is no possible manner that secular humanism could provide either A or B. It is logically possible, however, that both A and B are possible if God exists. Only a perfect moral being could be capable of providing perfect moral decrees. Therefore, in keeping with our definitions and conditions of “morality” and “objective” as concepts, only God could be considered an objective basis of morality. In this case we do not need to define “goodness” specifically in order to understand that an objective basis of morality must be attached to a concept of “God” - if it is possible at all metaphysically.
II. Empirical evidence confirmed by conventional definitions. - I can define what “goodness” and “morality” are “like” as qualities, without an appeal to God. Brit has proposed to offer an affirmative argument that there is an objective basis of morality. And I concur with Brit that “most of us agree” that there is an objective basis of morality, whether or not it can be logically explained and accounted for. Though we cannot demonstrate and prove that moral qualities exist in a science laboratory, human experience does concur with conventional definitions in a remarkable manner that certain things are “right” and others are “wrong” with these experiences being consistent with concepts such as goodness, honesty, justice, holiness, and so on. I agree with Dr. Craig that, “I clearly apprehend objective moral values and have no good reason to deny what I clearly perceive.” In other words, I have strong reasons to believe that “goodness” is an objectively “good” quality before examining what is logically possible as the meta-ethical objective basis. I am not thus arbitrarily “presuming that the [moral] aspects of God's nature are good” - but I have an empirical moral conscience and conventional definitions that testify that these qualities are good and based on Point I, God's existence would be the only possible explanation.
III. Possible historical events. - If we grant God's existence as a metaphysical possibility, then it's possible that certain biblical accounts of Jesus Christ, acting as Messiah, God incarnate, could be based on actual historical events. For example, Peter described Jesus performing an apparent miracle: “When Simon Peter saw this, he fell at Jesus' knees and said, "Go away from me, Lord; I am a sinful man!" (Luke 5.8). After living with Jesus for three years, the apostles apparently had such a firm conviction that Jesus was the morally-perfect Messiah that they (and their families) were willing to die for their testimony of Jesus as God incarnate, rather than recant and live.
First, I'd offer that Jesus spoke with a supreme moral authority and no one was apparently able to overcome his moral positions. His apparent goodness was so extraordinary that people came out of nowhere and wept at his feet, even as He forgave their sin (moral error). (Luke 7:36-50). It was not difficult for people to see that His standards were shown to be much higher than average, even assessed as perfect. If we allow the metaphysical possibility of God's existence, then it is possible that Jesus, as God incarnate, displayed perfect holiness and moral authority. One could ask: “How can we verify the standard of an apparent standard?” When John the Baptist doubted Jesus' authenticity, Jesus responded, “Go back and report to John what you have seen and heard: The blind receive sight, the lame walk, those who have leprosy are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the good news is proclaimed to the poor.” (Luke 7.22b NIV). Jesus basically refereed to historic prophecies He fulfilled, as only God incarnate could have. These hold veracity, and I agree with Dr. Craig that other evidence, including Craig's four other arguments for God's existence, can be considered as relevant, if I am supposed to offer support as to why it should be considered that an objective basis of morality is based on God's existence. If other arguments support the greater plausibility that God exists, then this offers greater plausibility that objective morality is based on God. As Craig notes, “In the [Craig-Law] debate, Law made the remarkable claim that the cosmological and teleological arguments are not even part of a cumulative case for theism! This is clearly wrong.”
If Christ did indeed live and walk the earth as a perfect moral authority, then the “goodness” and “rightness” of His authority was displayed physically and in action in many circumstances. In this case, “goodness” and “rightness” are identical to the qualities of “Messiah-ness” or “Jesus-ness” that had been displayed. Without “definitions alone” this perfect moral standard was experienced directly in society.
Jesus displayed moral acts and people recognized that these were “good”acts and these His life was morally superior to their own, in fact perfect. The only ones that opposed this conception were those that were offended by the possibility that Jesus was, in fact, God, as Jesus indirectly claimed. He claimed that the true standard of morality was moral perfection (Matthew 5.48). In order for my position to be valid, I don't necessarily have to prove that Jesus was actually morally perfect and actually exemplified it, I just have to substantiate that it is metaphysically and logically possible that He lived a morally perfect life and displayed perfect moral authority (in accordance with 4.I.A). I also want to emphasize that I am discussing a basis of objective morality, not a moral system or applied ethics in this example.
//, Brit has shifted the entire burden of the debate onto my shoulders//
B: Once again, entirely false. I do this such that the rules and qualifying criteria are clear, as I’ve now stated four times. Not to shift the burden. Its interesting that my opponent feels the need to misrepresent me so quickly. One has to wonder why. Now, if my opponent can give his basis and show why it derives oughts, we can proceed. Lets see if he evades further or if hes willing to proceed honestly.
R: While I agreed that it would be helpful to decide upon definitions before a debate, I've been skeptical about the explanation of why I need to divert the debate topic and format. The following site demonstrates that there are many conventional debate formats, and they all apparently begin with affirmative and constructive arguments in support of the debate topic position leading off the debate.
http://www.csun.edu/~dgw61315/debformats.html
Based on standard debate conventions, the one arguing in affirmation of a debate topic has the burden of of opening with affirmative and constructive arguments. I did agree to deviate from convention in order to keep the debate alive, by first offering support in affirmation of the objective basis of morality with regard to Christianity. And I don't appreciate the insinuation that I am being decisive for simply pointing out this deviation. Can you find one example of any conventional debate format where the debater arguing in opposition to the debate topic premise is required to first support their argument or open the debate in affirmation of an opposing position? If so, show a link to an example.
3. “// worldview I defend, the Creator-God's good nature is unchanging, eternal and prime, and therefore exists as an objective basis, per our definition of “objective ...irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being.”//
B: Notice, first, that while something with unchanging, eternal, and prime nature are not exclusive with objectivity, they are also by no means required for it. They're not meaningful criteria at all, as per the definition of objective (irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being.). Certainly, if my opponent wishes to demonstrate objectivity, he will need more than this.
R: Specific definition qualities of the concept “objective” are exclusive with objectivity, as we've agreed upon here: ”..irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective being.” And these definition qualities are also inclusive in terms of describing God's moral nature, as an eternal, unchanging state of moral perfection. There is nothing conceptually that could be, “more than this” - in my opinion, with regard to a meta-ethical objective basis of morality. Point 4 elaborates on the meaningful context of objective moral values.
4. “// God's nature embodies truth, justice, and holiness, in addition to goodness and mercy.//
B: But are truth, justice, holiness, and mercy objectively good moral things? Of course, most of us agree that they are on a knowledge basis but how does my opponent defend that these things are good? He uses them as a defense for God being a basis of morality by...apparently presuming that the aspects of God's nature are good. But to use this as a defense he must demonstrate, separately, that these aspects are in fact of good moral nature. So far, I see no defense for this and thus, no defense that God can be a grounding of objective goodness, except by tautological defense (which of course, fails).
R: Brit offers a very good question: “...how does my opponent defend that these things are good?” How can I defend that moral qualities attributed to God are “actually” good? The question is similar to: What is the standard outside of God that I use to claim to know what goodness is like in order to then claim that God is good? If I merely claim that God represents goodness and goodness is defined by God, then this is a tautology. I can address these questions with the following approaches.
I. Conceptual necessities and possibilities. - Based on the understanding that an objective basis of morality must be non-arbitrary and, “not influenced by personal feelings or opinions,” a non-arbitrary moral basis is only conceivably possible if, A) There is a supreme and capable moral authority and law giver that provides perfect moral decrees (see Essentialist Divine Command Theory, IV.4.), or, B) There is a valid and objective locus or standard of morality ( a perfect moral yardstick that applies to all moral agents and all moral questions). There is no possible manner that secular humanism could provide either A or B. It is logically possible, however, that both A and B are possible if God exists. Only a perfect moral being could be capable of providing perfect moral decrees. Therefore, in keeping with our definitions and conditions of “morality” and “objective” as concepts, only God could be considered an objective basis of morality. In this case we do not need to define “goodness” specifically in order to understand that an objective basis of morality must be attached to a concept of “God” - if it is possible at all metaphysically.
II. Empirical evidence confirmed by conventional definitions. - I can define what “goodness” and “morality” are “like” as qualities, without an appeal to God. Brit has proposed to offer an affirmative argument that there is an objective basis of morality. And I concur with Brit that “most of us agree” that there is an objective basis of morality, whether or not it can be logically explained and accounted for. Though we cannot demonstrate and prove that moral qualities exist in a science laboratory, human experience does concur with conventional definitions in a remarkable manner that certain things are “right” and others are “wrong” with these experiences being consistent with concepts such as goodness, honesty, justice, holiness, and so on. I agree with Dr. Craig that, “I clearly apprehend objective moral values and have no good reason to deny what I clearly perceive.” In other words, I have strong reasons to believe that “goodness” is an objectively “good” quality before examining what is logically possible as the meta-ethical objective basis. I am not thus arbitrarily “presuming that the [moral] aspects of God's nature are good” - but I have an empirical moral conscience and conventional definitions that testify that these qualities are good and based on Point I, God's existence would be the only possible explanation.
III. Possible historical events. - If we grant God's existence as a metaphysical possibility, then it's possible that certain biblical accounts of Jesus Christ, acting as Messiah, God incarnate, could be based on actual historical events. For example, Peter described Jesus performing an apparent miracle: “When Simon Peter saw this, he fell at Jesus' knees and said, "Go away from me, Lord; I am a sinful man!" (Luke 5.8). After living with Jesus for three years, the apostles apparently had such a firm conviction that Jesus was the morally-perfect Messiah that they (and their families) were willing to die for their testimony of Jesus as God incarnate, rather than recant and live.
First, I'd offer that Jesus spoke with a supreme moral authority and no one was apparently able to overcome his moral positions. His apparent goodness was so extraordinary that people came out of nowhere and wept at his feet, even as He forgave their sin (moral error). (Luke 7:36-50). It was not difficult for people to see that His standards were shown to be much higher than average, even assessed as perfect. If we allow the metaphysical possibility of God's existence, then it is possible that Jesus, as God incarnate, displayed perfect holiness and moral authority. One could ask: “How can we verify the standard of an apparent standard?” When John the Baptist doubted Jesus' authenticity, Jesus responded, “Go back and report to John what you have seen and heard: The blind receive sight, the lame walk, those who have leprosy are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the good news is proclaimed to the poor.” (Luke 7.22b NIV). Jesus basically refereed to historic prophecies He fulfilled, as only God incarnate could have. These hold veracity, and I agree with Dr. Craig that other evidence, including Craig's four other arguments for God's existence, can be considered as relevant, if I am supposed to offer support as to why it should be considered that an objective basis of morality is based on God's existence. If other arguments support the greater plausibility that God exists, then this offers greater plausibility that objective morality is based on God. As Craig notes, “In the [Craig-Law] debate, Law made the remarkable claim that the cosmological and teleological arguments are not even part of a cumulative case for theism! This is clearly wrong.”
If Christ did indeed live and walk the earth as a perfect moral authority, then the “goodness” and “rightness” of His authority was displayed physically and in action in many circumstances. In this case, “goodness” and “rightness” are identical to the qualities of “Messiah-ness” or “Jesus-ness” that had been displayed. Without “definitions alone” this perfect moral standard was experienced directly in society.
Jesus displayed moral acts and people recognized that these were “good”acts and these His life was morally superior to their own, in fact perfect. The only ones that opposed this conception were those that were offended by the possibility that Jesus was, in fact, God, as Jesus indirectly claimed. He claimed that the true standard of morality was moral perfection (Matthew 5.48). In order for my position to be valid, I don't necessarily have to prove that Jesus was actually morally perfect and actually exemplified it, I just have to substantiate that it is metaphysically and logically possible that He lived a morally perfect life and displayed perfect moral authority (in accordance with 4.I.A). I also want to emphasize that I am discussing a basis of objective morality, not a moral system or applied ethics in this example.
Second, Jesus could be considered the, “living yardstick” and
standard of perfect moral authority. If there is ever a discrepancy
regarding a manufactured yardstick, then it can be taken and compared
to the original metal yardstick which was made precisely as a
universal standard. If Jesus is Messiah, then it is metaphysically
possible that He embodies perfect holiness and moral purity, as a
consistent standard. This state could be considered, “objective”
as, “irrelevant to the opinions and preferences of any subjective
being.” If Brit can prove that Jesus did not exist, that Jesus
was not actually God incarnate, that Jesus committed any moral error,
or that Jesus was not recognized as exemplifying a comparatively
perfect moral standard, then Brit could remove this possibility.
Otherwise, Jesus Christ can conceivably provide support for an
exemplary perfect moral standard (a basis - not an applied ethical
system) and a logical bridge from “is” to “ought” without a
tautology.
5. B: “Why are we obligated to follow the commands of a powerful being? I see no justification for this.”
R: This subject was addressed in 4.I of this rebuttal. If there is one supreme and valid moral authority and law giver that provides perfect moral decrees then, logically, we would be obligated to follow the commands of such an authority. The onus would be on one to justify opposing this authority. I'd also add that, according to theistic explanations, we all have free will and are not strictly forced by God to follow God's commands or not to follow them. As created free moral agents, we can choose to do good or to do evil, to follow the moral commands of God, or to reject them. Christian doctrine outlines that God offered Jesus Christ as a means of redeeming humanity through Christ's propitiation of our sins (moral guilt). When this is taken into account, I'm not motivated to follow God's commands based on obligation. Rather, I am compelled to follow God based on gratitude. God's love is a more effective motivator towards repentance and holiness than obligation.
6. B: “Through what explanation does my opponent defend that God's nature/aspects are good, except by pure definition? Can my opponent separately (outside of mere definition) defend that these are good? If he can't, then God derives no authority and thus no ought, on this explanation.”
R: These questions were addressed in my points 4.I, II and III.
7. B: “My opponent's argument rests on Mercy, Justice, and other aspects being good and of God's nature, by mere definition...Thus my opponent establishes his basis by mere tautology of these allegedly good aspects...This is why I challenged my opponent to give criteria. His criteria are met by God by definition alone. By that criteria, virtually any secular system could qualify....I'll give my opponent one chance to edit his criteria.”
R: This is what I was concerned about. I was not actually preparing an "argument" - but was clarifying aspects of my basis of morality, fielding specific questions that Brit had asked me to clarify. However, I'm grateful that my opponent has offered me one chance to clarify my explanations. My points made in 4.I, II and III, outline various reasons why my objective basis of morality is not merely dependent on any tautological argument or supported merely by definitions alone. I've also underscored why this Christian explanation is both possible and plausible and why a secular humanist basis of objective moral values does not seem logically possible.
5. B: “Why are we obligated to follow the commands of a powerful being? I see no justification for this.”
R: This subject was addressed in 4.I of this rebuttal. If there is one supreme and valid moral authority and law giver that provides perfect moral decrees then, logically, we would be obligated to follow the commands of such an authority. The onus would be on one to justify opposing this authority. I'd also add that, according to theistic explanations, we all have free will and are not strictly forced by God to follow God's commands or not to follow them. As created free moral agents, we can choose to do good or to do evil, to follow the moral commands of God, or to reject them. Christian doctrine outlines that God offered Jesus Christ as a means of redeeming humanity through Christ's propitiation of our sins (moral guilt). When this is taken into account, I'm not motivated to follow God's commands based on obligation. Rather, I am compelled to follow God based on gratitude. God's love is a more effective motivator towards repentance and holiness than obligation.
6. B: “Through what explanation does my opponent defend that God's nature/aspects are good, except by pure definition? Can my opponent separately (outside of mere definition) defend that these are good? If he can't, then God derives no authority and thus no ought, on this explanation.”
R: These questions were addressed in my points 4.I, II and III.
7. B: “My opponent's argument rests on Mercy, Justice, and other aspects being good and of God's nature, by mere definition...Thus my opponent establishes his basis by mere tautology of these allegedly good aspects...This is why I challenged my opponent to give criteria. His criteria are met by God by definition alone. By that criteria, virtually any secular system could qualify....I'll give my opponent one chance to edit his criteria.”
R: This is what I was concerned about. I was not actually preparing an "argument" - but was clarifying aspects of my basis of morality, fielding specific questions that Brit had asked me to clarify. However, I'm grateful that my opponent has offered me one chance to clarify my explanations. My points made in 4.I, II and III, outline various reasons why my objective basis of morality is not merely dependent on any tautological argument or supported merely by definitions alone. I've also underscored why this Christian explanation is both possible and plausible and why a secular humanist basis of objective moral values does not seem logically possible.
Tags: debate on objective morality, is
there any objective basis of morality for secular atheists? basis
of Christian objective morality, theist objective morality
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